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INTRODUCTION
There are a number of reasons why analysis of the outcomes of the
Employment Contracts Act is both contentious and complex. The contentiousness is a reflection of the conflicts surrounding the passage of the legislation and the broader issues of the respective roles of unions, employers,
and the State in the establishment of conditions of employment and the
regulation of labor markets. Ideological divergence inevitably underpins debates on these matters and influences the data that are sought and disseminated in the public arena as supporting "evidence" for positions adopted. As
one commentator has said, "[t]he technique is simple. Quote only the material that supports your case, and do not address the critics. Do not even
mention them, because the reader might look up the critic and see the
strength of the argument, even if you have misrepresented it."'
The complexity lies in the limitations of the information available publicly to inform these debates. Statistics New Zealand, like many other government departments and agencies in recent years, has been forced into a
cost-cutting mode. Unlike Australia and the United Kingdom, New Zealand
has no regular reliable workplace surveys that establish sound bases for longitudinal assessments of changes in workplace conditions and practices.'
Most particularly, in the context of assessments of the impacts of the Employment Contracts Act, little systematic research and information is available about the secondary labor market. In terms of "evidence," some of the
key debates on the Act draw upon opinion-based surveys and limited if not
biased frames of reference and analysis. And other aspects of the assess. Senior Lecturer, Department of Management Studies and Employment Relations, The University of Auckland
.. Professor, Department of Management Studies and Employment Relations, University
of
Auckland.
1. Brian Easton, Ignoring the Critics,LISTENER, Feb. 1, 1997, at 60.
2. Erling Rasmussen, Workplace Reform and Employee Participationin New Zealand,
in INNOvATION AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION THROUGH WORKS CouNciLs 392 (Raymond
Markey & Jacques Monat eds., 1997).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997

1

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 [1997], Art. 19

276

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

ment, as we will see in examining the debate over productivity, are inherently problematic.
"Outcome" Measures: The Questions to Be Asked
Given the genesis of the Employment Contracts Act and its subsequent
history, any analysis of the Act's impacts, including ours, is likely to be
controversial. Reading the debates around the passage of the Employment
Contracts Act suggests that the perceptions of the major parties in those debates--employers, unions, government, and the political parties-as to the
"real" intentions and significance of the Act were, in their public expression
at least, quite different. The Act had multiple agendas attached to it. Some
of these agendas were quite explicit, as for example in the stated intention of
the Act as an Act designed to promote an efficient labor market through encouragement of voluntary unionism and individual contracting in employment matters? Evaluating achievements against such explicit intentions is
far from easy. But in addition, other agendas were implied, and these varied
according to a particular party's perception of the political and ideological
forces driving the legislation. The union perception, for example, was that
the Act was clearly designed to diminish union influence, undermine longstanding practices of collective bargaining, and drive down the real level of
wages.' Government spokesmen, however, saw the Act as opening up a
brave new world of higher productivity, increased employment opportunities, improved workplace relations, and widespread prosperity.5
Inevitably, given the differences in perception as to the intentions of the
legislation, the debate on the "outcomes" of the Act has been similarly polarized. Roger Kerr, Executive Director of the New Zealand Business
Roundtable, has rightly recognized that not all economic improvements in
New Zealand since 1991 can be attributed to the Employment Contracts
Act. Nevertheless, directly or by association, he argues that the Act has led
to economic, employment, and productivity growth; significant reductions
in unemployment; and "enormous changes in enterprise culture, in particular far greater trust and cooperation in workplaces, less disputation and more
job security."'6 In contrast, Ken Douglas, President of the New Zealand
Council of Trade Unions, argues that the Employment Contracts Act has
failed to raise national prosperity and has been "a key instrument in widen3. Employment Contracts Act, 1991 (N.Z.).
4. Ken Douglas, Organising Workers: The Effects of the Act on the Council of Trade
Unions and its Membership, in EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: NEW ZEALAND 197 (Raymond

Harbridge ed., 1993).
5. Bill Birch, A Stepping Stone on the Path to Prosperity, DOMINION, May 1, 1991, at
10; NATIONAL PARTY, NEW CHOICES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1991).

6. Roger Kerr, Obstacles to Employment and Productivity Growth in New Zealand's
Labour Market (Institute of International Research, 11 th Annual Industrial Relations Conference, 1997) (unpublished, on file with author).
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ing inequality in the distribution of income, wealth, and power in New Zealand, both between classes and within classes."7
Each party, in arguing about the outcomes of the Employment Contracts Act, gives precedence to a particular set of indicators, generally those
that are congruent with their original frames of reference concerning the
merits or otherwise of the legislation when it was originally conceived.
Since the range of indicators that can be drawn upon is quite large, it is not
surprising to find frequently that the parties talk past each other. Positions
are reinforced but not modified on the basis of the available data and its
possible interpretations. While we must accept that there can be no final
objective assessment of the impacts of the legislation, it may nevertheless
be helpful to clarify the different kinds of questions that are being asked
about the Act's outcomes. We can then look at the extent to which there are
data available to throw light on these questions before re-engaging the debate about the relationship of these data to the Act itself.
This Article discusses some of the issues raised by attempts to measure,
evaluate, and agree upon the outcomes of New Zealand's Employment
Contracts Act 1991. It initially sets out a range of questions that have been
raised concerning the impacts of the Act. It then summarizes, on the basis of
research completed to date, the answers to some of those questions in so far
as they are currently known. For the sake of analysis, we have classified the
questions being asked in association with the Employment Contracts Act
related to the period since 1991 into four categories: institutional, economic,
social, and political.
Institutional'
Has there been a shift from collective to individual bargaining and from
collective employment contracts to individual employment contracts? What
changes have there been in representation in bargaining? What changes
have there been in union membership numbers and in union density? What
changes have there been in the numbers and forms of disputes and in the
procedures used to resolve them?
Economic
What movements have there been in real wages? What changes have
there been in wage dispersion? What has happened to productivity in general and labor productivity in particular? What changes have there been in
levels and kinds of unemployment? What changes have there been in labor
7. Ken Douglas, Forming Productive Partnerships for Greater Prosperity, Productivity
and Parity (Institute of International Research, 1lth Annual Industrial Relations Conference,
1997) (unpublished, on file with author).
8. The questions in this category concern bargaining relationships and the institutional
structures and processes surrounding bargaining.
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force participation? Has there been increased casualization of work? Has
there been a shift from full-time to part-time employment? Do workers have
more or less job security?
Social
What have the impacts been on New Zealand society? Is there greater
or lesser disparity in the distribution of wealth and status? Have the rich become richer and the poor poorer? Do people have more or less in control of
their lives? Are they more or less dependent upon the state? Do they have an
increased or decreased sense of economic and social security? Is there an
increased or reduced sense of equity and justice? Is there a greater or lesser
sense of community?
Political
Has there been a shift in the balance of power in the workplace between
workers and management and between unions and management? Has there
been a shift nationally in the relative power and influence of unions and
employers vis-a-vis government? What has been the impact of the debates
surrounding the Employment Contracts Act on the relative standing and
electorate appeal of the political parties and on the viability of alliances

between them?
Other questions could have and have been asked in relation to the outcomes of the Employment Contracts Act, and some of them provide the basis for other contributions to the present Symposium. In broad terms, the debates to date in New Zealand have clustered around data related to
institutional and economic questions and the interrelationships between
them. Indeed, as we shall see, much of the advocacy for further reform of
the Act rests on the presumption that additional institutional changes, particularly with respect to the roles of the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal, provide the key to improved economic performance. In
contrast, in-depth considerations of the Act's impacts from a societal and
equity perspective, very necessary as they are to a more comprehensive assessments of its outcomes, are less common.9
BargainingInstitutions and Outcomes
The institutional questions are the easiest to answer. The Employment
Contracts Act has had clear and measurable impacts on bargaining structures and bargaining processes and the role of bargaining agencies. Since
1991, there has been a massive shift from collective employment contracts
9. But see ELLEN J. DANNIN, WORKING FREE (1997), for a social equity focus rather than
a purely economic and institutional one in assessing the outcomes of the ECA.
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(CECs) to individual employment contracts (IECs). It has been estimated
that collective contracts covered around 56 to 60 percent of the total employed workforce prior to May 1991." This was to some degree attributable
to the notion of "blanket coverage," whereby wages and conditions were
applied to a particular industry or occupation." The elimination of blanket
coverage produced an immediate shift towards individual employment contracts, with 45.6 percent of the workforce being on IECs by February 19922
and 56.6 percent by February 1993." There has been no economy-wide survey focusing on the distribution of collective and individual employment
contracts since February 1993. It is possible, however, to establish a rough
estimate of the distribution by piecing information together from surveys of
bargaining trends and from the two databases of collective employment
contracts.' 4 The two databases cover around 20 to 24 percent of the workforce, but there are probably a number of smaller CECs that are not covered
by the databases. 5 Thus, we would estimate that around 25 to 30 percent of
the workforce are covered by CECs.
The shift from CECs to IECs, together with the fall in union density described below, have brought large changes in bargaining representation.
However, the unions have kept their representation status when it comes to
the negotiation of CECs. According to the two databases on CECs, unions
represent over 80 percent of all employees covered by CECs.' 6 While there
has been a rise in representation by other employees at the workplace, there
has yet to be a significant increase in the use of professional "bargaining
agents."
Of all the direct outcomes that can be unequivocally attributed to the
Employment Contracts Act, the massive decline in union membership has
10. Jelle Visser, Trends in Union Membership, 1991 EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 97-134.
11. JOHN DEEKS ET AL., LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 66

(1994).
12. Grant Andrews & Erling Rasmussen, Quarterly Employment Survey, February
1992-Survey of Employment Contract Coverage, in DIVERGENT PATHS? 30 (Nigel Haworth et
al. eds., 1993).
13. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, LABOUR MARKET 1994 159 (1995).
14. The most influential and comprehensive surveys are the following: HEYLEN RESEARCH CENTRE & TEESDALE MEUUI & Co., A SURVEY OF LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT
UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS Acr 1991 (1992); HEYLEN RESEARCH CENTRE, A
SURVEY OF LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AcT 1991
(1993); JOHN SAVAGE & DAVID COOLING, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF A
SURVEY ON THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AcT (NZEIR Working Paper 96/9, 1996). It should
be noted that the Department of Labour undertook another survey in August 1996, but the
survey results have yet to be published. See Mathew Deamaley, Survey of ContractsAct and
Election Year Not Linked, N.Z. HERALD, Mar. 16, 1996, at 5.
15. Raymond Harbridge & Aaron Crawford, The Employment Contracts Act and Collective Bargaining Patterns: A Review of the 1996/97 Year, in EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS:
BARGAING TRENDS & EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1996/97 6 (Raymond Harbridge et al.
eds., 1997); DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, CONTRACT 22 (1997).
16. Harbridge & Crawford, supra note 15, at 6; DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, CONTRACT
supra note 15, at 22.
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been the most marked. There was an immediate decline in union membership from 603,118 members in March 1991 to 428,160 in December 1992.'
While the membership decline has continued since then, it has been of a
lesser magnitude-to 362,200 in December 1995.18 The current stagnation in
union membership must be seen in relation to the large increase in employment since 1992. Because of the inability of unions to recruit a sufficient
number of new members in the last three or four years, 9 there has been a
continuing fall in union density-from around 41 percent in March 1991 to
around 21.7 percent in December 1995.20 Interestingly, the number of trade
unions increased from 58 in December 1992 to 82 in December 1995."
Consequently, despite union mergers and closures in the intervening period,
by the end of 1995 the number of unions was almost identical to the number
in existence (80) at the time of the passage of the ECA.
In discussing the data on disputes, it is necessary to distinguish between
collective disputes in terms of work stoppages (strikes and lockouts) and individual disputes in terms of claims before the Employment Tribunal. The
number of recorded work stoppages has been relatively stable in the 199196 period, fluctuating between 54 stoppages in 1992 and 69 stoppages in
1995 .2' However, the picture is different when the impact of stoppages on
working days and wages lost is considered. Lost working time was the highest in 1992, with 113,700 working days lost, compared4o only 23,800 days,
38,300 days, and 53,400 days lost, in 1993, 1994, and 1995, respectively. A
similar picture is found when the loss of wages is considered. The latest official figures released show the same level of disputation, as there were 74
stoppages involving 44,400 employees in the year to December 1996.
The level of lockouts fluctuated strongly. Lockouts constituted between
4.2 percent and 11.1 percent of all stoppages in the 1991-94 period, but declined sharply in 1995 to constitute 2.9 percent of all stoppages.' The decline in 1995 is probably associated with the fact that, subsequent to a decision by the full bench of the Employment Court in June 1994," a partial
17. Raymond Harbridge & Anthony Honeybone, Trade Unions Under the Employment
Contracts Act: Will the Slimming Be Fatal?, in THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 235 (Peter Boxall ed., 1995).
18. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, LABOUR MARKET 96, 123 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND].

19. Unions have recruited new members, but some unions-for example the Service
Workers union-will have to recruit at least 20 percent of its total membership each year to
avoid an overall decline in its membership numbers.
20. Aaron Crawford et al., Unions and Union Membership in New Zealand:Annual Review for 1995, 2 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 2, 188-93 (1996).
21. 1997 STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, supra note 18, at 123.
22. Erling Rasmussen, New Zealand Employment Relations-Settling Down or... ?, 2
INT'L EMP. REL. REV. 59-73 (1996).
23.

1997 STAISTICS NEW ZEALAND, supra note 18, at 122.

24. Id. at 104.
25. Felicity Lamm, Chronicle, 19 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 334 (1994). The case was Witihera v. Presbyterian Support Services (Northern), A.E.C.31/94 (E.C.), June, 17, 1994.
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lockout is no longer considered lawful under the Act. It is mainly in manufacturing and in the public sector that work stoppages have occurred. The
two industrial classifications-"manufacturing" and "community, social,
and personal services" (which partly incorporates the public sector)accounted for over 75 percent of all stoppages during 1992-95. In 1995, the
public sector lost more in working days and wages than the private sector.
Since the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act, there has been
a significant growth in claims brought to the Employment Tribunal. In the
year to June 1992, the Tribunal received 2,332 applications. This increased
to 5,144 cases in the year to June 1996.26 The large majority of these applications were in respect of personal grievances alleging unjustified dismissal.' A number of explanations can be offered for this growth.' First,
the Act significantly expanded coverage of the personal grievance procedures, with people on individual employment contracts gaining access to the
Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court.' Many of these people
have the resources, education, and will to take cases to the Tribunal.
Second, the growth in tribunal cases has been influenced by the declining role of unions in settling disputes before they enter the legal grievance
machinery, and the willingness of other employee representatives (mainly
lawyers and consultants) to take claims to the Tribunal and Court on a contingency fee basis. To this must be added the incentive effect, prior to April
1997, of avoiding the 26-week stand-down period before unemployment
benefits were payable. The stand-down period covers employees leaving
their employment voluntarily, but employees who could prove in front of
the Tribunal that they were unjustifiably dismissed could draw such benefits
immediately. It has been alleged that, as a consequence, a number of claims
have been prosecuted on flimsy ground or on the basis of procedural irregularities in the dismissal process. In April 1997, in part implementation
of the recommendations of the Employment Taskforce, 0 the stand-down period was reduced to 13 weeks. It remains to be seen whether this will influence the number of cases taken to the Employment Tribunal.
It has become a frequent complaint from employers and unions alike
that American-style litigation has become more accepted in New Zealand in
recent years. The rise in personal grievance cases brought to the Employment Tribunal, and in occupational safety and health cases brought to the
26. Harbridge & Crawford, supra note 15, at 47.
27. Alastair Dumbleton, The Employment Tribunal-Four Years On, 1 N.Z. J. INDUs.
REL. 22 (1996).
28. Raymond Harbridge, Recent Industrial Disputes and the Impact on Future Industrial
Relations Management (Institute of International Research, 11 th Annual Industrial Relations
Conference, 1997) (unpublished, on file with author).
29. Erling Rasmussen et. al., Industrial Relations and Labour Market Reforms in New
Zealand, in STATISTCS HuMAN REsouRcEs DEVELOPMENT OUrLOOK 1995-1996 (Pacific Cooperation Council (PECC), 1996).
30. Erling Rasmussen & Gavin Schwarz, Chronicle, 30 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 344-45
(1995).
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District Courts, and the detailed attention paid by employment relations
managers to procedural and contractual matters, are all indicative of such a
shift towards increased litigation over employment issues. It can be argued
that the Business Roundtable and the New Zealand Employers' Federation
have contributed to this trend, since their long campaign against the Employment Court (in particular, the notion of procedural fairness) has convinced many employees that "it is impossible to dismiss anybody." One can
also speculate that the large compensations to employees mentioned in the
media have been another contributing factor. "
The non-prescriptive or "enabling" nature of much of the Employment
Contracts Act has, in the determination of lawful employment practices,
placed too great an emphasis on the development of legal precedents. This
has given rise to more cases at the Employment Court and to numerous appeals at the Court of Appeal. It is a cumbersome, drawn-out process which
adds to the insecurity of employers and employees and has significant costs
both for the parties involved and for the society as a whole. As we shall see
below, it has also created considerable debate about the need for further reform (or abolition) of the Employment Tribunal and Employment Court.
Wages and Wage Dispersion
The economic questions are more difficult. There is some evidence on
what has happened in the period since 1991 in terms of real wage levels,
wage dispersion, productivity, and employment. How much of what has
happened is attributable, directly or indirectly, to the Employment Contracts
Act and how much to other changes in the New Zealand economy in the last
six years is a more contentious matter. First, however, let us look at the prevailing opinions and data.
Average hourly earnings have increased every year in the 1990s, from
$13.78 per hour in February 1990 to $15.80 per hour in February 1996, a
15-percent rise.32 This number compares with an increase in the Consumer
Price Index of 15 percent over the same period.13 Average real hourly earnings have therefore been stagnant in the 1990-96 period. Furthermore, the
Real Wage Index fell from 1,003 in December 1993 to 978 in March 1996, 34
a decline of 2.5 percent during a very strong economic upswing. There is
also a slight shift in favor of higher incomes which is mainly offset by a fall
in the lower incomes; in terms of real wages, the better paid improved their
position relative to the less well paid. 5 While the Index underepresents certain wage rises, these figures nevertheless indicate why so many people
have complained that they have not felt the fruits of the economic upswing
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Erling Rasmussen, Chronicle, 1 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 115 (1995).
1997 STATISTICS NEw ZEALAND, supra note 18, at 94.
Id. at 86, 96.
Id. at 96, 102.
Id. at 104.
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of 1993-1996.
There was an expectation prior to the Employment Contracts Act that
the dismantling of the award system would lead to increased wage dispersion, it being assumed that weaker employee groups would fail to keep up
with other employee groups in a system of market-driven, decentralized
wage negotiations. These expectations were fulfilled in the first two years
after the Act by the widespread downward adjustment or abolition of penal
rates and overtime payments. These cuts to penal rates and overtime payments were clearly evident in the two databases on collective employment
contracts,36 in the economy-wide surveys conducted by the Department of
Labour,37 and in numerous individual case histories.
In this context, discussion amongst employment relations researchers
has mainly been about whether the concessions obtained by employers fell
short of expectations prior to the Act. Thus, employer behavior in the 199193 period has been described as moderate, rather than either progressive or
aggressive." The influential Heylen surveys conducted by the Department
of Labour in 1992 and 1993 appear to be a source of confusion by downplaying the radical changes imposed on employees. This influence may explain why significant adjustments to conditions can be interpreted as
"moderate" employer behavior. For example, the so-called moderate or
"inactive" employers introduced significant changes to employment conditions: they scored lowest on average take-home pay rises; 16 percent of
them had reduced or abolished overtime pay rates; 39 percent had increased
work effort; and 10 percent had reduced the ability to accumulate leave.39
Other researchers have pointed to the significant concessions obtained by
employers in that period.4' These concessions have become very important,
since employees have had little success in reversing them as the economic
upswing gathered pace from 1993 onwards.'
Clearly, cuts to penal rates and overtime payments would have their
most significant effects in those areas of the labor market where hourly
36. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, CONTRACT, supra note 15, at vols. 3-8, July 1992-Feb.

1994; Kevin Hince & Raymond Harbridge, The Employment Contracts Act: An Interim Assessment, 3 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 243-44 (1994).
37. HEYLEN RESEARCH CENTRE & TEESDALE MEULI & Co., supra note 14; HEYLEN
RESEARCH CENTRE, supra note 14.
38. Peter Boxall, Management Strategy and the Employment Contracts Act 1991, in
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCES 148-64 (Raymond Harbridge ed.,

1993); Peter Boxall, Management Strategy and Employment Relations in New Zealand: An
Analysis of ContemporaryPatterns and Outcomes, INT'L EMPLOYMENT REL. REV. 1, 27-37
(1995); Erling Rasmussen & Peter Boxall, Workforce Governance, in THE CHALLENGE TO

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 53-88 (Peter Boxall ed., 1995).
39. HEYLENRESEARCH CENTRE, supra note 14.

40. Jon Henning, The Employment ContractsAct and Work Stoppages, 1 N.Z. J. INDUS.
REL. 77-92 (1995).
41. Erling Rasmussen, Workplace Transformation Under the Employment Contracts
Act, in CURRENT RESEARCH IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 457-59
(Ray Fells & Trish Todd eds., 1996).
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wage payments were predominant. The expectation, therefore, was that such
cuts would have a particularly strong effect in low-wage, low-skilled areas
such as retailing, cleaning, and care-giving. This assumption has been supported by the research to date, though there are still amazingly few studies
of the effects of the ECA on the so-called secondary labor market. Harbridge and Street, in a survey of women in the service sector, found that
around 30 percent of their respondents had had wage reductions subsequent
to the introduction of the Act.42 Similarly, an Auckland pilot study found
that women and youth had a vulnerable position in the "new labour market."
In 1994 and 1995, the two groups had obtained substandard outcomes in
wages and conditions compared to other groups.43 The predominance of
women in particular occupations has meant that it has become more difficult
to sustain the gender wage differentials that had been established before the
Act.M One commentator has predicted, "[t]here are clear signs that there are
differential results for men and women employees under the Act. Women
are less likely to have had basic pay or take-home pay increases, or have
achieved less tangible results such as an increase in job satisfaction. '45 There
appears to be little dispute of this increase in wage dispersion: ".... in the
first two years following the Act there was increased variation in the size of
settlements, leading to a major readjustment of traditional wage relativities.... Moreover, these figures are likely to understate the increase in
wage dispersion given the shift towards individual employment contracts. 4 6
Thus, the Act has put considerable financial pressure on people in the
so-called secondary labor market, a conclusion clearly drawn by Ken
Douglas, the leader of the union confederation, the New Zealand Council of
Trade Unions, when he writes: "Different measures of wage movement all
show a widening gap between the top and the bottom."'' It must be stressed
42. Raymond Harbridge & Maryan Street, Labour Market Adjustment and Women in the
Service Industry:A Survey, 1 N.Z. J. INDus. REL. 23-34 (1995).
43. Erling Rasmussen, Employee Awareness and Attitudes-A Pilot Study, 2 LAB.
MARKEr BULL. 89-101 (1996).
44. Alastair Pringle, The Pursuit of Flexibility in the New Zealand Supermarket: The
Employment Contracts Act, Continuities and Discontinuities, 3 N.Z. J. INDus. REL. 306-25
(1993); Janet Hector et al., Industrial Relations Bargaining in the Retail Non-food Sector:
1991-1992, 3 N.Z. J. INDus. REL. 326-41 (1993). Suzanne Hammond & Raymond Harbridge,
The Impact of the Employment ContractsAct on Women at Work, 1 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 15-30
(1993).
45. Richard Whatman et al., Labour Market Adjustment Under the Employment Contracts Act, 1 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 72 (1994).
46. OECD, ECONOMIC SURVEY: NEW ZEALAND 56 (1996).
47. Douglas, supra note 7, at 4. The real disposable income index has also been used to
demonstrate that wage dispersion has increased. However, this index did not include people
working less than 30 hours a week, which leads to an underestimation of the dispersion effects. However, "[t]he Department of Statistics plans to discontinue this index, releasing instead a Real Wage Rate Index. This new index will not be reported for the income quintiles
and accordingly in the future the disparities between different income groups will not be visible." (Hince & Harbridge, supra note 36, at 246). As shown above, the Real Wage Index actually fell during the economic upswing. There are clearly sections of the workforce where
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again that the increased wage dispersion generally highlighted in the research to date may have been only partially facilitated by the Employment
Contracts Act. For example, changes in the profile of the New Zealand labor
force-becoming older and better educated and with relatively more professional employees-would increase the pressure to widen wage differentials, ' repeating the pattern of rising qualifications-based wage differentials
found by Sholeh Maani in the 1981-1991 period. 9 Thus, while the research
evidence generally points to an increased dispersion in wages, this increase
is also in line with more general demographic trends and qualificationsbased rises in wage differentials. Moreover, a detailed analysis by Sylvia
Dixon' -still to be published-finds little growth in wage dispersion in the
period from 1984 to 1995. This is a puzzling finding. It makes us cautious in
our overall evaluation of the effects of the Act on wage dispersion. Given
these ambiguities and unresolved issues, further analysis will be warranted
when the census data for the 1991-96 period becomes available.
Employment, Unemployment, and Casualization
Since 1992 there has been strong employment growth in New Zealand
and a sharp decline in unemployment. From 1992 to 1995, over 120,000
new jobs were created, providing the basis for an 8-percent increase in employment in the period. While the employment growth has been strong, the
most remarkable feature of the economic upswing has arguably been the
sharp turnaround in unemployment. Unemployment, which had increased
from 3.6 percent in 1987 to 11.1 percent in 1992, was down to 5.9 percent
by December 1996. These changes in levels of employment and unemployment are even more encouraging when seen in the context of a labor force
that has expanded every year to date throughout the 1990s.5 Following the
Employment Taskforce report in 1995, the government took a more proactive approach to activation of the unemployed, an approach that appears
pay rises are slow to filter through: "Over the 27-month period from the index's base of December 1992 quarter to the March 1995 quarter, 36 percent of surveyed ordinary time pay
rates did not change." STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, LABOUR MARKET 1995, 154 (1996). In the
same period, the average surveyed ordinary time pay rates increased by 4.9 percent, which
indicates the skewed distribution of pay rises.
48. Sylvia Dixon, The Inter-industry Wage Structure: 1971-1994, 1 LAB. MARKET BuLL.
62 (1995).
49. SHOLEH MAANI, INVESTING IN MINDS: THE EcONOMicS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN

NEW ZEALAND (forthcoming 1997).
50. Sylvia Dixon, The Distribution of Earnings in New Zealand, 1984-1995, in RESEARCH INTO LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND WORK IN NEW ZEALAND

(Philip Morrison ed.,

forthcoming 1997). Interestingly, Dixon points in another article to the possible pro-cyclical
bargaining power position of low-wage, low-skilled workers. Dixon, supra note 48. Thus, the
very strong economic upswing during 1993-96 could have compressed wage/skills differentials, as low-wage, low-skilled workers fared better in a tight labor market.
51. STATISTICS NEw ZEALAND, LABOUR MARKET 1995 65, 95 (1996) [hereinafter 1996
STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND].
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to be continuing under the new Coalition Government.' This approach is
important as unemployment has edged upwards in 1997.
Around three-quarters of all new jobs created in the 1994-96 period
have been full-time jobs. At the same time, there has been a continuous rise
in the numbers in part-time employment and in self-employment.53 This has
led to talk about "McJobs" and casualization. ' While part-time employment
in itself cannot be interpreted as a clear indicator of casualization, there are
indications that some part-time employment falls in this category." Thus,
there has been a strong growth in part-timers that are looking for more hours
and in part-timers seeking a full-time job. The number of part-timers who
would prefer to work more hours increased by 27 percent from February
1991 to February 1996. In the same period, the number of part-timers who
were looking for full-time work increased by 22 percent. There was also a
strong rise in contractors by over 22 percent in the 1991-96 period. Similarly, there has been an 18 percent increase in multiple jobholders in the
1991-96 period, as more people raised their income by having more than
one job. Finally, there is strong anecdotal evidence that some employers are
using on-call arrangements and split shifts more.
There are, however, some surveys that indicate that casualization has
occurred to a much lesser degree than expected. 6 In our evaluation, we put
less emphasis on the figures from these surveys since they have signifi52. Although it is beyond this Article to deal with it in detail, it must be pointed out that
there are several less positive features contained in the rosy employment figures. These negative features have become more pronounced as the economy slowed down in 1996 after the
exceptional growth spurt in 1993-95. Some examples have recently been mentioned by the
Minister of Social Welfare, Mr. Roger Sowry:
In the year ended June 1966, our strong economy saw 62,000 more people
employed but only 5,000 fewer on unemployment benefits, and an extra 7,000
on other benefits. Between 1991 and 1996, the number of unemployment
beneficiaries fell by 12 percent. Domestic purposes beneficiaries rose by 11
percent, numbers of sickness beneficiaries rose by 68 percent, and invalid
beneficiary numbers rose by an equally staggering 44 percent. By last year, 21
percent of working age people were dependent on a benefit, compared to just
8 percent in 1985.
Roger Sowry, Moves to Break Welfare Dependency Cycle, EvENING POST, Mar. 14, 1997, at
4; Kevin Hince & Raymond Harbridge, The Employment Contracts Act: An Interim Assessment, 3 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 243-44 (1994).
53. 1996 STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, supra note 51. Erling Rasmussen, John Deeks &
Maryan Street, The Entrepreneurial Worker: Changes to Work and ContractualRelationships, in ACCORD OR DIsCORD? 335-56 (Jocelyn Gibson ed., 1996).
54. Erling Rasmussen, Chronicle, 2 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 231, 233 (1995).
55. The figures in this paragraph are all from 1997 STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, supra
note 18, at 61.
56. Peter Brosnan & Pat Walsh, The ECA and Non-standard Employment in New Zealand 1991-95, in RESEARCH INTO LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND WORK IN NEW ZEALAND (Philip
Morrison ed., forthcoming 1997); Anne Knowles, Impact of a Greater Casualisation of the
Workplace on Your IR Strategy (Institute of International Research, 11 th Annual Industrial
Relations Conference, 1997) (unpublished, on file with author).
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cantly less statistical "robustness" than the figures from the official surveys
done by Statistics New Zealand. It must also be noted that the use of fixedterm employment contracts has probably been restricted by the interpretation of their status by the Employment Court. It will be interesting to see
whether a recent decision on fixed-term employment contracts by the Court
of Appeal will lead to a more widespread use of such contracts.57
While the debate about casualization, "McJobs," has focused on people
working less than 40 hours per week, it may be just as worrisome that more
and more people are increasing their hours at work. An upward pressure on
working time has made the 40-hour week less prevalent under the Employment Contracts Act. The workforce is now split into roughly three sections
where a third (32.9 percent) usually work less than 40 hours a week, another
third (31.7 percent) usually work the traditional 40-hour week, and the remaining third (35.4 percent) work more than 40 hours a week.
"Of those people who usually work more than 40 hours, a significant
proportion usually work very long hours. About one in four people (147,000
or 26.4 percent) who usually worked more than 40 hours in 1994/95 usually
worked at least 60 hours, with 60,300 (10.8 percent) usually working at least
70 hours." 58Thus, there has been a strong rise in the average weekly hours
normally worked by full-time male employees: from 44.61 hours in 1991 to
45.31 hours in 1996. In the 1991-96 period, the number of men working on
average 50 to 59 hours per week increased by 30 percent, while the number
of men working on average more than 60 hours per week increased by 31
percent. These numbers clearly raise some pertinent questions about work
distribution and the balance between work and family life, and have important longer term implications for health, safety, productivity, and effective
decision-making.59
A Productivity Failure?
The Employment Contracts Act was promoted as a way of creating a
new and more productivity-oriented employment relations culture to support
the extensive restructuring of the economy. 60 "By introducing voluntary unionism and changing bargaining procedures it will increase productivity,
enhance employment and encourage the sharing of benefits that flow from
increased output."'" The award system and compulsory unionism were regarded as major blockages to more productive work practices, 62 and it was
57.
at 50.
58.
59.
60.

Peter Cullen, Court Rules on Fixed-term Contracts,NAT'L Bus. REv., June 13, 1997,
1997 STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, supra note 18, at 177.
Id. at 114.
Birch, supra note 5.

61. NATIONAL PARTY, ELECrION.MANIFESTO 27 (1990).
62. See, e.g., PENELOPE BROOK, FREEDOM AT WORK: THE CASE FOR REFORMING LABOUR
LAW IN NEW ZEALAND (1990).
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assumed by many-even some opponents of the Act-that the new Act
would facilitate a lift in productivity levels.' However, there seems to be
little argument that productivity performance has been disappointing under
the regime of the Employment Contracts Act. Why this has been the case is
one of the key current debates surrounding the Act. In particular, widespread reports of improved productivity within many individual organizations have had surprisingly little impact on the official figures on labor productivity.
While productivity growth is frequently mentioned in association with
employment relations changes, it is notoriously difficult to measure actual
productivity increases across an economy. Measurement problems arise in
the context of assessing productivity in areas where the product is servicenow covering the major part of employment through the various service
sectors and the public sector, in the increased emphasis on quality rather
than quantity in the output of goods and services, and in the growing use of
non-standard labor (e.g., casual, part-time, and contractors). These problems
have surfaced in the current debate in New Zealand, as the various estimates
presented below illustrate. In fact, some economists have taken to using
survey information-surveys of managers' opinions about productivity increases-as their evidence for satisfactory productivity growth.' While it is
clearly no solution to rely on opinion surveys, it highlights one of the key
issues in the current debate: managers and some organizations have recorded significant productivity rises, which have yet to influence the national statistics. Finally, it is difficult to agree on what a satisfactory level of
productivity growth would be, since this issue was not specified at the introduction of the Act.
There have been several estimates of post-ECA productivity growth.
The OECD has estimated a 1.5 percent per annum productivity growth in
the 1992-96 period,6' a situation the OECD clearly finds unsatisfactory. Its
figures show a decrease in 1995, but its overall productivity estimate appears to exclude the recent slow-down in economic activity in the mid1990s. The Reserve Bank expects a trend in labor productivity growth of no
more than 1.25 percent per annum." Vic Hall has estimated a 2.0 percent
per annum rise in labor productivity and 2.3 percent in total factor productivity, over the three years to March 1995.6 These estimates have often been
quoted by proponents of the Employment Contracts Act as indicating posi-

63. Easton, supra note 1, at 12.
64. See, e.g., JOHN SAVAGE, WHAT Do WE KNOW ABOUr THE ECONOMIC IMPACr OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRAcrs AcT (NZIER Working Paper 96/7, 1996).
65. OECD, supra note 46, at 10.
66. Don Brash, The New Inflation Target and New Zealanders' Expectations About Inflation and Growth, Address to Canterbury Employers Chamber of Commerce (Jan. 23,
1997).
67. Vic Hall, New Zealand'sEconomic Growth. Fantastic,Feeble, or FurtherProgress
Needed, VIcTORIA ECON. COMMENTARIES, Mar., 7 1996.
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five productivity outcomes from the legislation.' However, labor productivity is no higher for the 1992-95 period than Hall's estimates for the 1979-87
and 1987-1992 periods. The estimates also relate to the economic expansion
phase' and, "[g]iven that the most recent year's data, which are not included
in Hall's analysis, showed negative growth in output per hour, it is highly
likely that total factor productivity was lower, bringing the average closer to
the 1.3 percent mark." The labor productivity figures in Table 1 below are
at the lower end of the various estimates, though Gobbi's estimate of a 0.9
percent average labor productivity per hour worked in the four years to December 1996 is fairly similar."
72
Table 1: Aggregate Labor Productivity (% p.a. cha ge)

Years

Real

Employment

GDP

Labor
Productivity

1978-1984

2.0

0.1

1.9

1984-1988

2.0

0.6

1.4

1988-1992

-0.4

-2.2

1.9

1992-1996

3.8

3.1

0.7

Although there are some variations in the estimates, the expected increase in productivity argued by the proponents of the Act still remains to
be seen. "The absence of a clear improvement in output per hour growth
rates, combined with a rapid fall in productivity growth in the last two
years, has raised questions about why better outcomes have not been evident
in the post-reform period." 3 This is difficult to answer, since there appears
74
to be no single reason why the productivity performance has been so low.
In employment relations terms, there appear to be several factors at play.

68. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 6; Roger Kerr, Employment, Productivity and Growth All
Blossom Underthe Employment ContractsAct, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 5, 1996, at A17.
69. Hall, supra note 67, at 8.
70. Maria Gobbi, Bryan Chapple & Michael Fletcher, Labour Market Trends and Outlook, 1 LAB. MARKET BULL. 20 (1996).
71. Maria Gobbi, Some Notes on Determining Real Wage Movements, 1 LAB. MARKET.
BULL. 97 (1997).
72. Brian Philpott, A Note on Recent Trends in Labour Productivity Growth, VICTORIA
U. PAPER 3 (1996).
73. Gobbi et al., supra note 70, at 14.
74. Brian Easton, Productivity Puzzle, LISTENER, July 27, 1996, at 51; Easton, supra
note 1.
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First, the restrictions on productive work practices may have been less
than previously assumed. As Brian Easton has stated,
[m]ore generally, it is possible that the various allegations of unions interfering with the market are not true. It may be that unions do not inhibit
productivity gains or compress wage differentials to an extent that when
and wage disperthey are weakened there are major increases in output,
7
sion. That is the experience in the case of the ECA.
This argument shifts the focus to more deep-seated influences and to
the efficiency of management practices. Another commentator has said, "[it
seems that the problem lies with the quality of management in the average
NZ business. We certainly can't blame the trade unions for the country's recent productivity performance. Management has had a freer hand than at
any other time in living memory." 76
Second, the productivity assumption behind the Act may have floundered because of more systemic factors. Some of these factors could be a
tight monetary policy (resulting in a significant currency appreciation and
high real interest rates); inadequate infrastructural investments and reduced
public services; and a rise in transaction costs through the fragmentation of
bargaining and the counter-productive effect of an avalanche of employment relations legislation since the mid-1980s. The New Zealand Council of
Trade Unions (NZCTU) has constantly criticized the assumed productivityenhancing effects of the Employment Contracts Act.7 7 The NZCTU has argued that inadequate investments in infrastructure, education, and training,
and the continuous restructuring of public services, together with the shortterm contractual focus created by the Employment Contracts Act, would act
as barriers to high, sustainable productivity growth. 8 The focus on transaction costs is associated with the idea that the fragmentation of bargaining
has increased the bargaining effort at organizational level. While this must
be regarded as a short-term investment to improve long-term organizational
effectiveness,79 it may also have reduced productivity in the short term.
Likewise, the extensive legislative reforms-at least nine new comprehensive legislative packages over the last 10 years-have added a further burden to organizations already strained under the adjustment to the new economic environment.
Third, employers may not have used the productive opportunities created by the Act. Peter Boxall has argued that too few organizations have
implemented better work practices and that, generally, the implementation

75.
76.
1997.
77.
78.
79.

Easton, supra note 1, at 12.
Peter Boxall, The Great LabourProductivity Debate, EMPLOYMENT TODAY, June 4,
Douglas, supra note 4, at 198.
NEW ZEALAND COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS, ELECTIONBACKGROUNDER 1-12 (1996).
Rasmussen & Boxall, supra note 38.
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of new work practices has been of limited scope.80 An indication of the latter
point is that, in spite of a very active Workplace Reform movement in New
Zealand, no widespread implementation of workplace reform has taken
place. Few organizations are involved in full-scale workplace reform.
Rather, there is a tendency to pick and choose organizational changes instead of applying a holistic approach, and there is a distinct preference for
task-related participation schemes."' Boxall also suggests that the small size
of many New Zealand private sector organizations is a considerable barrier
to reform processes that might lead to productivity improvements.82 This
may interact with the managerial "overload" and the short-term rise in
transaction costs mentioned above. Additionally, the changes to employment conditions instituted by employers in the 1991-93 period could have
hampered the introduction of new, productive work practices. The undermining of "psychological" or "implicit" contracts would make sustainable,
productive workplace changes difficult to achieve. Whether that has actually
happened is difficult to establish, though there are some indications in that
direction.8
Finally, it must be stressed that the current approach to industry training
may not overcome the traditional problems in this area and facilitate a move
towards a high-wage, high-skill economy.8 ' The industry training approach
was radically altered by the Industry Training Act 1992. In 1993, the OECD
found that "[1]ittle information is available on the amount and quality of
business investment in skills, but it appears that in-company training efforts
are weak by international standards." 85 This assessment still applies, and a
recent OECD report pointed to a shortage of skilled workers as a barrier for
growth opportunities.86 There has been some increase in the overall training
effort in recent years, with more training modules being available and more
people participating.' Unfortunately, this relative increase appears substantial only when compared with the severe cut-back in training efforts in the
1987-1993 period. The economic upswing has coincided with skills shortages. There are still concerns that inadequate government funding, the unsystematic development of the Industry Training Organizations (ITOs), and
80. Boxall, supra note 76.
81. Rose Ryan, Workplace Reform in New Zealand-the State of Play, WORKPLACE N.Z.
REP. (1995); Rasmussen, supra note 2.
82. Boxall, supra note 76.
83. See, e.g., Francis Wevers, ManagerialPerception of the Quality of Human Resource
Management Practice in New Zealand, NZIM REP. (1995); Francis Wevers, The New Zealand Index of Human Resource Management and OrganizationalEffectiveness, NZIM REP.
(1996). Erling Rasmussen & Andrea Jackson, Employment Relations in the New Zealand
Banking Industry (OECD-MIT Research Network Paper on Banking, May 1996).
84. Boxall, supra note 82, at 31-32. Erling Rasmussen, New Zealand Employment Relations-Settling Down Or... ?, 2 INT'L EMPLOYMENT REL. REV. 43-57 (1996).
85. OECD, ECONOMIC SURVEY, NEW ZEALAND 104 (1993).
86. SUNDAY STAR-TIMES, Apr. 6, 1997, at D8.
87. 1996 STATISTICS NEw ZEALAND, supra note 51, at 139-40.
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tensions between the key public agencies are blocking a widespread and
concerted training effort.u The traditional employer reluctance to invest in
training has yet to be overcome and a "training culture" yet to be established
in New Zealand organizations.
Insufficient InstitutionalReform?
During the debate of the Employment Contracts Bill, the Business
Roundtable, N.Z. Employers' Federation, and the Treasury were rebuffed in
their attempt to abolish specialist labor law institutions. Instead, the Cabinet
endorsed the formation of separate institutions-the Employment Tribunal
and the Employment Court. 9 Since then the Business Roundtable and the
Employers' Federation have conducted a vigorous campaign to overturn this
policy. This campaign has gathered momentum in the 1994-97 period, with
publication of a number of articles and papers attacking the Employment
Court." The ferocity of the debate prompted the Chief Justice, Sir Thomas
Eichelbaum, to the unprecedented move of criticizing "well-heeled sectors
of the community" for trying to pressure the government and the judiciary
to alter the justice system in accordance with their own interests.9 The debate has been the focus of an entire issue of the New Zealand Journalof Industrial Relation' and it has been featured frequently in the various law
journals.
Currently, officials from the Department of Labour are analyzing the
decisions made by the Employment Court as part of a review of the Employment Contracts Act by the Coalition Government. It appears that the
employers' campaign will be a fruitful one, since the current Minister of
Labour, Mr. Max Bradford, a former employee of the Employers' Federation, has publicly aired several misgivings about the decisions made by the
Employment Court.93
Besides the attempts to fashion all spheres of society in line with their
88. Barbara Myers, Industry Training in New Zealand in the 1990s, Research Essay,
University of Auckland (unpublished thesis, 1996). Erling Rasmussen et al., Where Are We
and How Did We Get Here? Skills, Skills Shortages and Industry Training in New Zealand,
in CuRRENr REs. IN INDuS. REL. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 473-84 (Ray Fells & Trish Todd
eds., 1996).
89. Pat Walsh & Rose Ryan, The Making of the Employment Contracts Act, in EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS: NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCEs 13-30 (Raymond Harbridge ed., 1993).
90. See, e.g., C. Howard, The Interpretation of the Employment Contracts Act, N.Z.
BusiNEss ROUNDTABLE (1995); Graham Hunt, Employment Court Judges Need to Fall into
Line with Free Market, NAT. Bus. REV., May 17, 1995 at 13; Bernard Robertson, Judges
Should Stick to TheirLegal Knitting, NAT. Bus. REv., June 21, 1996, at 16.
91. Chief Justice Takes Poke at Business Roundtable, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 24, 1996, at
A3.
92. 21 N.Z. J. I.R. (Apr. 1996).
93. Max Bradford, Curb Judicial Activism to Make the ECA Work as Parliament Intended, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 14, 1997, at 8-9. Gordon Campbell, The Max Factor,
LISTENER, May 3, 1997, at 24-26.
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philosophical ideas, the employers' attack on the Employment Court can be
associated with several trends. First, the Court is the icon of separate institutions, and abolishing the Court and transferring its jurisdiction to the High
Court would be a significant step towards abolishing separate institutions.94
While the attacks have focused on the Employment Court, it appears that
Employment Tribunal, thereby creating an
the end goal is also to abolish the 95
"employment at will" framework. Secondly, Employment Court decisions
in a number of areas have been attacked. In particular, the Court's firm intention to uphold the notion of "procedural fairness" has raised the ire of
employers. The employers' attacks on Court decisions have also focused on
bargaining issues such as access for bargaining agents,96 bargaining agent
recognition, harsh and oppressive contracts, and home workers' contractual
status.
The focus on bargaining issues is caused by the "permissive nature"
of the Employment Contracts Act, which left bargaining guidelines
"incomplete, inconsistent and invisible."9 7 Thus, the notion of "fair" bargaining practices has constantly been challenged by both sides. For example, employers have tried to avoid bargaining with the duly chosen bargaining agent and instead sought to communicate directly with employees.
Although this practice has been restricted to some degree by several Employment Court and Court of Appeal decisions, there is still room for further
interpretation: "As these decisions illustrate, the boundaries and parameters
of bargaining under the legislation is both a fluid and developing process. It
will undoubtedly continue to be so as employers and employees test and
extend the legal boundaries of bargaining.""
It has also been common practice to bypass the employee protections
under the Employment Contracts Act by employing workers as contractors.
This use of notional contractors may be restricted in the future because of a
recent Court of Appeal decision which deemed ten home-care workers to be
employees.99 This decision created some media debate, as it involved the
Central Regional Health Authority as the employer with the workers being
paid less than half the statutory minimum wage in some cases.'" In occupa94. Bernard Robertson, The Arguments for a Specialist Employment Court in New Zealand, 1 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 34-48 (1996).
95. Gordon Anderson, Introduction, 1 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 3 (1996).

96. While the popular term "bargaining agent" is used, it is clear from the section on
bargaining outcomes above that unions are still representing the vast majority of employees
in collective bargaining.
97. Lorraine Skiffington, The Role of Specialist Legal Institutions in Bargaining Under

the Employment Contracts Act 1991: Saboteurs or Saviours?, 1 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 50
(1996).
98. Peter Kiely, Employment Law Update, in EMPLOYMENT CoNTRACrs: BARGAINING
TRENDS & EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1995/96 58 (Raymond Harbridge et al. eds., 1996).
99. Cashman v. Central Regional Health Authority, Aug. 26, 1996 [1996] 2 E.R.N.Z.
159.
100.
A13.

Landmark Decision a Fillip for Home Workers, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 28, 1996, at
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tional health and safety, the district courts have stepped up the attack on
negligent employers with a number of recent cases resulting in large fines.
Interestingly, the courts are now awarding part of the fines to the victims,
which has prompted talk about the re-introduction of lump-sum accident
compensation payments in another form.' The focus on Occupational
Overuse Syndrome (OOS) incidents has also increased since the first wellpublicized conviction of an insurance company."
Finally, the growing tension between the Employment Court and the
Court of Appeal has been used by the Employment Court's opponents as an
indication of the Court being out of touch. The Court of Appeal, the appeal
court for Employment Court decisions, has recently overturned a whole
string of Employment Court decisions. This trend could in part be associated with a number of liberal-minded Appeal Court judges leaving the
bench in 1994-95 and the Court of Appeal now regularly having a majority
of conservative judges on the bench.0 3
Reading the Outcomes of the ECA
In summary, then, what is our reading of the outcomes of the Employment Contracts Act to date? The Act has had a number of direct institutional
consequences. These include the rapid acceleration of the move to individual employment contracting, marked by the growth of individual employment contracts (IECs) and the reduction in collective employment contracts
(CECs); the reduced role for unions in bargaining, particularly in the private
sector; the decline in union membership and in union density; and the
greater use of legal remedies in employment disputes and grievance resolution. These direct consequences have, in turn, a number of flow-on effects.
One is a general shift in the balance of power in the workplace between
workers and management, giving management increased autonomy in the
definition of the terms and conditions of employment contracts and employment relationships. This is mirrored at national level in the reduced impact of the NZCTU on national economic and social policy and the general
disappearance of active tripartite institutions contributing to policy making
on the national stage.'" The reduction in union influence in the workplace
has also led to a greater role for the legal institutions of the employment relations system-the Employment Tribunal and Employment Court-in adjudicating matters related to employment security and disciplinary issues.
101. Kiely, supra note 98, at 69-75. The courts' ability to award lump-sum compensation payments was abolished by New Zealand's Accident Compensation legislation.
102. Rasmussen & Schwarz, supra note 30, at 344.
103. Peter Haynes, Guilty or Not Guilty, EMPLOYMENT TODAY, June, 1997.
104. The NZCTU's need to appeal to the ILO on matters associated with the ECA can
be seen as indicative of this changed status. See Nigel Haworth & Steve Hughes, Under
Scrutiny: The ECA, the ILO and the NZCTU Complaint 1993-1995, 2 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 43162 (1995).
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However, employers and other powerful business interests have seen these
institutions as defending the interests of those who are now less able to defend themselves through collective action. As a result, the actions and decisions of the Tribunal and Court have been brought increasingly into question, thereby increasingly politicizing these institutions.
The economic impacts of the Act have been less clear cut. Changes in
real wages, labor, productivity, and levels of employment and unemployment obviously have some relationship to the ECA. However, how large (or
small) this relationship is cannot be determined with any great confidence,
given the general economic upturn in the economy in the period under review. We have looked in detail at the productivity data and observed that
the anticipated productivity benefits of the Act have not been forthcoming.
On wage dispersion, our general conclusion, notwithstanding the ambiguities in some of the data, is that there has been a growing gap between the
better off and the less well off in the labor force and that some of this
movement is a direct consequence of the Act. Rising qualifications-based
wage differentials may in part explain this change. Nevertheless, the severe
reductions in penal rates, overtime rates, and fringe benefits in the years
immediately following the passage of the Act, and the greater intensification
of work, have created a significant segment in the workforce who have been
severely disadvantaged economically by the Act and who have not seen
their economic position substantially improved during the 1993-1996 economic upturn. For these people, the wage dispersion effects of the Act can
be clearly seen as the rich getting richer and the poor poorer. The social impacts of this situation may be seen specifically in the increased number of
beneficiaries in New Zealand"°5 and, more generally, in a growing understanding that New Zealand is now a much more divided and less egalitarian
society than it has traditionally aspired to be.
Looking to the Future
The Coalition Agreement of December 1996, which established the
policy basis for the alliance in government between the National Party and
New Zealand First, placed the continuation of the employment relations regime instituted by the Employment Contracts Act at the heart of the coalition government's industrial relations policy. Coalition policy, however,
does anticipate some amendments to the Act in the period before the next
general election in 1999. Described by the Minister of Labor as "fine tuning," these amendments would include bringing closely related legislation
such as the Holidays Act and the Wages Protection Act under the umbrella
of the Employment Contracts Act; increasing the obligation on employers to
recognize and negotiate with the bargaining agents chosen by employees;
and incorporating into the legislation, if possible, Employment Court deci105. See Dixon, supra note 48.
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sions on personal grievances to make more explicit the respective obligations of employers and employees in personal grievance cases, especially
those cases arising in the context of dismissals and in the conclusion of
fixed-term contracts.'0° At the time of completing the present Article (Aug.
1997), there was no sign of draft legislation to implement any of these policy intents. In the meantime, however, the government had moved during
1997 to increase, from March 1, 1997, the statutory minimum wage for
adult employees to $7 an hour, and the youth minimum wage to $4.20 an
hour, promising at the same time to proceed during 1997 with the review of
youth rates outlined in the Coalition Agreement and to commission research
on the employment impact of the rise in the minimum wage.
The government continues to be under pressure, particularly from the
New Zealand Business Roundtable, to instigate further institutional reform
in the employment relations system by abolishing the Employment Tribunal
and Employment Court. While concerned with "minimising judicial activism,"' 7 the government has given no firm indication that it will pursue such
a path. Rather it is determined to ensure, after a study of the Employment
Court's decisions, that the underlying intentions of the Employment Contracts Act are not being undermined. There is clearly some tension within
the government. The Minister of Labor, Mr. Bradford, has been quite critical of rises in the statutory minimum wages and has taken a "hawkish" line
on the review of the Act." Thus, the review may lead to further amendments to the Employment Contracts Act or to reconsideration of the case for
abolition of the separate jurisdiction for employment law.
Whether a change in government in 1999 will lead to the repeal of the
Employment Contracts Act is a moot point. In the business community, the
Act has been promoted, alongside the Reserve Bank Act of 1989 and the
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1994, as one of the key foundations of the economic reform process and a necessary component of "a coherent economic
strategy." In the last decade in New Zealand, notwithstanding the different
party complexions of government, the influence of business on economic
and social policy has been immense."° Nowhere has this been more marked
than in the industrial relations system where the growth in business influence in national policy making on employment and labor market matters has
been mirrored by a growth in employer power in the workplace. Thus, while
it is likely that the present Coalition Government will collapse in 1999, we
see no evidence at present that a change in government will bring into place
a radically different employment relations regime for the new millennium.
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